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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

hostile, or had special or exclusive knowledge of the facts, the special
78
circumstances rule has been held satisfied and disclosure permitted.
Courts have been reluctant, however, to allow pretrial examinations in
other than these well-settled cases, for example, if the examination
would only assist the moving party in his trial preparation. 9
In Kenford Co. v. County of Erie,80 a contract action, the defendants intended to interpose the affirmative defenses of fraud and misrepresentation, and in order to aid their preparation, moved to examine
three nonparty witnesses without showing any of the traditional special
circumstances. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, modified
the trial court's order allowing the examination of two of the nonparty
witnesses, unanimously holding that the mere involvement of one of
them in transactions which led to the formation of the subject contract
constituted sufficient special circumstances to justify his examination. 8'
The other nonparty witness was excused since the defendants sought to
interrogate him only with respect to his activities after the execution
s2
of the contract.
Kenford, in effectively assimilating the special circumstances
requirement as to nonparty witnesses within the general rule calling
for "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action . . . " is a laudable step toward removing
the last remnants of distinction between parties and nonparties at the
pretrial disclosure stage.
CPLR 3101(d): Names of eyewitnesses, even if obtained by investigation, are discoverable if they are material and necessary.
Generally, under the CPA, a party was not entitled to disclosure
of the names of witnesses which the other party intended to use at
78 See, e.g., Brooklyn Express Co. v. Key Food Stores Cooperative, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d
608, 335 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.); General Bldg. Supply Corp. v. State, 63
Misc. 2d 520, 312 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Ct. Cl. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 500, 520 (1971); Williams v. Sterling Estates, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 692, 245
N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963); 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d §§ 42:83-85 (1966); 3
WK&M
3101.31; cf. Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2 App. Div. 2d 430, 156
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956).
79 See Pearson v. Pouthier, 33 App. Div. 2d 531, 314 N.Y.S.2d 302 (4th Dep't 1969)
(mem.); McDonald v. Gore Mt. Ski Lift Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 931, 293 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d
Dep't 1968) (mem.); 3 WK&M
3101.33.
8041 App. Div. 2d 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't 1973) (mere.).
81id. at 587, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302, citing 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3101, commentary at
25-27 (1970). In his commentary, Professor Siegel states:
If a witness holds the key, or merely a key, to any substantial fact involved in the
case, how can any lawyer in this day and age be compelled to go to trial without
knowing intimately what that witness is going to say?
Id. at 27.
8241 App. Div. at 587, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
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trial.8 3 Where, however, the witness was an active participant in the
events relied on by the party seeking disclosure,8 4 or if it would otherwise be impossible for the party to establish the events that occurred, 5
disclosure was granted.
CPLR 3101(a), in providing for "full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action .... "
disregarded this approach. Despite the enactment of this provision and
its liberal construction by the Court of Appeals," some lower courts
nonetheless adhered to the participant-observer distinction,8 7 while
other courts permitted disclosure on a showing that, due to injury, a
party had been unable to obtain the names of witnesses at the scene.8 8
Subsequently, the participant-observer distinction was abandoned,
and disclosure of the names of all eyewitnesses was permitted although
hardship or special circumstances were not alleged.89 Where the
identity of such witnesses was uncovered through post-accident investigation, however, this information was deemed "material prepared for
litigation"'90 and therefore unobtainable unless it could "no longer be
duplicated" and withholding it would result in "injustice or undue
hardship."9' 1 This rule was adopted by the Second Department 92 and
became known as the Hartley-Varner rule.98
In Zellman v. Metropolitan TransportationAuthority," the Ap83 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 44 (1970); 3 WK&M
3101.11.
84 Pistana v. Pangburn, 2 App. Div. 2d 643, 151 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep't 1956) (mem.).
85 McMahon v. Hayes-73rd Corp., 197 Misc. 318, 98 N.YS.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1950).
86 Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302, 324 (1968).
87 Coleman v. Kirkey, 53 Misc. 2d 947, 279 N.YS.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 436, 453 (1968). This rule,
however, was much criticized. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 45 (1970); 3
WK&M
3101.11; McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 19 SYRACUSE L. lrv. 501, 525-26 (1967).
88 See, e.g., Majchrzak v. Hagerty, 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 268 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JonN's L. REv. 279, 305 (1966);
discussion and cases cited in Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.YS.2d 394, 397-98
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
89 Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 135, 140 (1969).
90 Id. at 624, 296 N.YS.2d at 399. Accord, Workman v. Boylan Buick, Inc., 36 App. Div.
2d 978, 321 N.Y.S.2d 983 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.); Peretz v. Blekicki, 31 App. Div. 2d 934,
298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S
L REv. 313, 331 (1969). Hartley also held that the names were not part of the attorney's
work product unobtainable under CPLR 3101(c).
91 CPLR 3101(d).
92 Varner v. Winfield, 33 App. Div. 2d 807, 307 N.Y.S.2d 3 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.)
Note the dissent by Justice Munder who argued that the Hartley distinction was based
on a misreading of CPLR 3101(d) and should be discarded to aid the discovery process.
98 See 7B McKnqNEY's CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 10 (1972).
94 40 App. Div. 2d 248, 339 N.Y.S.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1973). Cf. Clamp v. Boldt, 62 Misc.
2d 886, 310 N.YS.2d 91 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1970) (mem.).
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pellate Division, Second Department, recently discarded the HartleyVarner rule, unanimously holding that the names of eyewitnesses
obtained by the plaintiff's investigation were discoverable if material
and necessary to the defense of the action. 95 Although in Zeliman the
defendants had, in fact, conducted a fourteen-month investigation
which failed to locate any witnesses, and had offered to reimburse the
plaintiff for half the cost of her investigation, the court clearly did not
base its holding solely on these facts. The court stated that the prior
holdings which regarded names of eyewitnesses as material prepared
for litigation resulted from a "strained construction" of CPLR
3101(d), 6 and that the basis of the old rule was the belief that one
party should not be permitted to reap the benefits of his adversary's
work where the facts were equally available to both sides.9 7 While this
is not an invalid concern, a likely effect of the old rule was that all resisting parties would automatically allege that the information sought
was the product of a post-accident investigation. 8 The court, in rejecting the Hartley-Varnerrule, made no reference to undue hardship
or due diligence as a prerequisite to obtaining disclosure.
Zellman removes the last barrier to obtaining the names of eyewitnesses under CPLR 3101. Hopefully, it will be followed by the
other departments. What remains unclear is whether additional requirements of good faith, due diligence, or mandatory payment procedures
will be added to the new rule.
CPLR 3113(b): Court allows videotaping of pretrial examination.
CPLR 3113(b) specifies no exclusive means of recording pretrial
examinations. In Rubino v. G. D. Searle & Co.,9 9 the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, permitted the first New York videotaping of a deposition. Rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the use of videotape
95 The Second Department also reached the same decision as to a third-party defendant in a companion case, Wolken v. E.W. Howell Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 545, 339
N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.). The court in Wolken did not limit disclosure to
"the names of eyewitnesses to be called," as a passage in Zellman indicated (40 App. Div.
2d at 251, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 258), but ordered "[d]isclosure of the names and addresses of
eyewitnesses to the accident, learned by plaintiff in a post-accident investigation... ." 41
App. Div. 2d at 546, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 273. See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169
N.Y.L.J. 47, Mar. 9, 1973, at 4, col 3.
90 40 App. Div. 2d at 251, 339 N.YS.2d at 258. The court noted that the statements of
such witnesses constitute material prepared for litigation.
97 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 10 (1972), for an analysis of
this area, especially discussion of the 1970 Judicial Conference proposal for court determination of fees to be paid by the party seeking disclosure to the resisting party.
98 Id.

99 73 Misc. 2d 447, 340 N.Y.$.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).

